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Title: The Current Status of the Gaza Strip under International Law 
 
 
Starting in 2005, there have been major changes in the situation prevailing in the 
Gaza Strip.  The Egyptian uprising, in particular, had important consequences that have 
changed the balance of control over the Strip.  Israel’s degree of control has declined and 
the local Palestinian degree of control has increased.  Israel still holds power over many 
aspects of Gaza’s national life, including most of its means of access to the outside world, 
but Gaza now has an independent door to the world via its southern border with Egypt.  
This thesis analyzes whether or not the legal status of occupation which has prevailed in 
Gaza since the 1967 war still holds today in light of these changed circumstances.  The 
relevant legal standards and the facts on the ground are reviewed, leading to the 





NAME OF AUTHOR: Devin W. Kenney 
 
 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
 
 University of Oregon, Eugene 




 Master of Arts, International Studies, 2013, University of Oregon 
 Juris Doctor, 2013, University of Oregon 
 Bachelor of Arts, English, University of Iowa 
 
 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST 
 
 International humanitarian law 
 International human rights law 
 International legal order 




Assistant Director – Program to Enhance Legal Assistance for Victims of Human 




GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS 
 
Thurber Fund award, University of Oregon, 2011 
 vi 








II. THE CHANGING SITUATION AFTER 2005 ..................................................................6 
 
III. IS GAZA STILL OCCUPIED? .........................................................................................13 
Factors Suggesting that Gaza Is Still Occupied...........................................................13 
Factors Suggesting that Gaza Is No Longer Occupied ................................................21 
 
IV. LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF GAZA’S CURRENT STATUS ..........................................24 
 







A NEW FACT PATTERN IN THE GAZA STRIP? 
 
Introduction 
For several decades after the 1967 war in the Middle East, there was a general 
consensus in the international-law community on the legal status of the Gaza Strip (and 
the other territories that had fallen under Israeli control): it was occupied territory.  Since 
2005, however, a series of changes in the pattern of facts in Gaza has taken place that 
affects the question of occupation.  In autumn of that year, Israel withdrew its settlements 
and permanent military presence.  In 2011, after a period in which Gaza’s borders 
remained mostly closed, the situation changed further as a consequence of the Egyptian 
revolution.  The new government that eventually took power in Egypt stopped 
cooperation with Israel’s border closure policy, so that control of the southern Rafaḥ 
crossing point shifted out of Israeli hands and into those of Egyptian and Palestinian 
actors.  The common effect of these developments has been to change the situation in 
Gaza, possibly “removing a basic reference point” from the conflict.1  Because 
occupation is a legal status as well as a factual situation, it is possible that the changed 
facts have led to a changed situation under international law.  The occupied or non-
occupied status of Gaza today is the topic of this thesis. 
 
Legal Background 
Before we can understand the legal status of Gaza today, it is helpful to be aware 
of the legal history.  This chapter will review the international consensus on Gaza’s legal 
status after 1967, which was shaped by occupation law.  Occupation law is a branch of 
international humanitarian law (also known as the laws of war).  Modern occupation law 
appears mainly in the Fourth Geneva Convention, a multilateral treaty which states in its 
second article that it is applicable “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognized by one of them,” as well as “to all cases of partial or 
                                                
1 Geoffrey Aronson, “Issues Arising from the Implementation of Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza 
Strip,” Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 34, no. 4, Summer 2005, pp. 49–63, at p. 57. 
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total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.”2  Gaza was under Egyptian control from 1949 until the 
1967 war.  Both Israel and Egypt had signed and ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention 
by 1967, when Israel took over Gaza in the course of the war.3  Gaza might be said to be 
occupied territory on this basis. 
But the Convention refers to “occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party,” and Egypt was never the legal “owner” of Gaza.  Gaza is sometimes described as 
being under Egyptian “administration” after 1948, though some scholars have argued that 
the Egyptian presence was an occupation.4  Because of the legal question about Gaza’s 
status before 1967 and the “territory of a High Contracting Party” language, Israel has 
argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply.5  Israel has officially used the 
term “administered territories” to describe all the areas overtaken in the 1967 war. 
Legal counterarguments to the Israeli position have been raised.  One is that the 
reference to “territory of a High Contracting Party” does not necessarily mean territory 
legally belonging to the party, and should be considered to include territory under the 
                                                
2 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, in 
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950) ([New York?]: n.d., ca. 1950), treaty no. 973, pp. 287–392 
(henceforth cited as “Geneva IV”), Art. 2, ¶¶ 1, 2, at p. 288. 
 
3 Egypt signed the Convention on the day it was executed, 12 August 1949, and deposited its ratification on 
10 November 1952.  United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950) ([New York?]: n.d., ca. 1950), treaty no. 
973, p. 396 (signature); idem, vol. 150 (1952) ([New York?]: n.d., ca. 1952), p. 372 (ratification).  Israel 
signed the Convention on the same date and deposited its ratification on 6 July 1951.  Idem, vol. 75, p. 397 
(signature); idem, vol. 96 (1951) ([New York?]: n.d., ca. 1951), p. 326 (ratification).  Israel’s only 
reservation to the Convention was that it would use the Red Shield of David as its international 
humanitarian symbol, instead of the Red Cross or Red Crescent.  Idem, vol. 75, pp. 436, 438.  Egypt did not 
use a reservation to “exclude a treaty relationship with Israel,” as Arab League states have sometimes done.  
Stephen M. Boyd, “The Applicability of International Law in the Occupied Territories,” Israel Yearbook on 
Human Rights, vol. 1 (1971), pp. 258–61, at p. 258. 
 
4 See e.g. Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001), p. 3.  Roy does not specify whether she means occupation in the legal 
as well as the factual sense. 
 
5 Meir Shamgar, “The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories,” Israel Yearbook 
on Human Rights, vol. 1 (1971), pp. 262–77, at pp. 263–6.  Shamgar was Israel’s Attorney-General at the 
time he wrote this article.  See also Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status 
of Judea and Samaria,” Israel Law Review, vol. 3, no. 2, April 1968, pp. 279–301, at pp. 281–94.  Israel 
still held the same position in 2003–4.  International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), 9 July 2004, in Reports 
of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: 2004, vol. 1 ([The Hague?]: n.d., ca. 2004), pp. 136–271 / 4–
139 (dual-paginated) (henceforth cited as “I.C.J., Occupied Palestinian Territory”), ¶ 90, at p. 173 / 41. 
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party’s control regardless of ownership.  U.S. State Department official Stephen Boyd 
presented this argument at a 1971 symposium of legal scholars in Israel: 
 
I do not think that the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross, which 
coordinated the drafting of the treaty] expressly considered the sovereignty 
question in drafting the Convention.  Their intent was to provide . . . a widely 
accepted Convention for the protection of the inhabitants of occupied territories, 
with the language broad enough to include the type of situation in which Israel 
finds itself now.  It does not say ‘the sovereign territory of a High Contracting 
Party,’ but merely ‘the territory.’  The Red Cross has interpreted this language 
consistently with the purpose and intent of the Convention, which is protection of 
individuals in a humanitarian way, not the settlement of disputed questions of 
sovereignty, which obviously the Convention was not intended to do. 
It would seem to me that if that little phrase in Article 2 were troublesome to a 
particular State, such as Israel in this case, it would be very easy to acknowledge 
the applicability of the Convention with whatever kind of reservations were 
deemed necessary to protect a Government’s position on a disputed question of 
territorial sovereignty.6 
 
The Commentary to the Convention prepared by the Red Cross makes a similar 
suggestion that a reservation could be used as a way for states to apply the Convention in 
civil wars without having to legally recognize the enemy side.7  Other sections of the 
treaty also suggest that it can apply despite legal controversies between enemy parties.  
Article 3, paragraph 4, for example, states that though the Convention may be applied to 
non-international violence this “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the 
conflict.”8  The Commentary also states that the Convention must be given effect even if 
there may be territorial changes after a conflict.9  Most importantly, the purpose of the 
                                                
6 Remarks of Stephen M. Boyd in the “Human Rights in Time of War” session of the Tel Aviv University 
Faculty of Law “Symposium on Human Rights,” 1–4 July 1971, printed in Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights, vol. 1 (1971), pp. 366–92, at pp. 367–8. 
 
7 Oscar M. Uhler, Henri Coursier, Frédéric Siordet, Claude Pilloud, Roger Boppe, René-Jean Wilhelm, & 
Jean-Pierre Schoenholzer, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1994; reprint of 1958 original) 
(from series The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, Jean S. Pictet, series editor) 
(henceforth cited as “Uhler et al., Commentary”), p. 43. 
 
8 Geneva IV, Art. 3, ¶ 4, at p. 290.  See also Uhler et al., Commentary, pp. 30, 44. 
 
9 Uhler et al., Commentary, pp. 16–17, 18, 275–6.  Accord “Report of the Third Commission: Condition 
and Protection of Civilians in Time of War,” pp. 272–301 in International Committee of the Red Cross, 
comp., Report on the Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions for 
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Convention is, as it says in the title, “the Protection of Civilian Persons,” and narrow 
application of the treaty would not be in agreement with this purpose.10  The Regulations 
annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the other relevant treaty, have a 
section on occupation with the same purpose.11  The article of this Convention defining 
occupation has no language limiting it to the sovereign territory of a signatory state,12 so 
it would seem that Gaza would be included. 
Other states, including the “powers friendly to Israel,” have not agreed with 
Israel’s position.13  There was a broad international legal consensus after the 1967 war 
that the Convention did apply to the Palestinian areas, and that their legal status was 
occupied territory.  The United Nations Human Rights Council,14 the General 
Assembly,15 the Security Council,16 the U.S. government,17 “most Governments in the 
                                                
the Protection of War Victims (Geneva, April 14–26, 1947) (Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 1947) (henceforth cited as “I.C.R.C., ‘Report of the Third Commission’”), p. 274. 
 
10 For more on the broadness of the Convention’s purpose, see Uhler et al., Commentary, pp. 12–4, 27, 44, 
51, 200, 272, 273–4; I.C.R.C., “Report of the Third Commission,” p. 269. 
 
11 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed “Regulations respecting 
the laws and customs of war on land,” adopted 18 October 1907, printed in United States Statutes at Large, 
March 1909 − March 1911 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), vol. 36, part 2, pp. 
2277−2309 (henceforth cited as “Hague IV”), Regulations Arts. 43–56, at pp. 2306–9.  See also Uhler et 
al., Commentary, pp. 3, 273–4.  The Hague Convention applies to all states because it has become 
customary international law.  Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nürnberg, 1 October 1946, 
in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 
1945 − 1 October 1946 (Nürnberg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, 1947), vol. 1, pp. 171−364, at pp. 254, 334; 
I.C.J., Occupied Palestinian Territory, ¶ 89, at p. 172/40. 
 
12 Hague IV, Regulations Art. 42, ¶ 1, at p. 2306. 
 
13 Testimony of Rita E. Hauser to the U.S. House of Representatives on 12 September 1977, in Israeli 
Settlements in the Occupied Territories: Hearings before the Subcommittees on International 
Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations, 95th 
Congress, 1st session, 12, 21 September & 19 October 1977 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978), p. 95. 
 
14 See e.g. U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution S-9/1, adopted 12 January 2009 at the 9th special 
session, in Report of the Human Rights Council: Tenth Session (2–27 March 2009) . . . Eleventh Special 
Session (26–27 May 2009) (United Nations: New York, 2009) (supplemental volume to General Assembly, 
Official Records, 64th session), Supp. No. 53, U.N. doc. no. A/64/53, pp. 153–6, preambular ¶ 6, operative ¶ 
5, at pp. 153, 154. 
 
15 See e.g. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3092A, adopted 7 December 1973 at the 2193rd plenary 
meeting, in Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Twenty-Eighth Session, vol. 1, 18 
September – 18 December 1973 (New York: United Nations, 1974) (supplemental volume to General 
Assembly, Official Records: Twenty-Eighth Session), Supp. No. 30, U.N. doc. no. A/9030, pp. 28–9. 
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world,”18 the International Committee of the Red Cross,19 the High Contracting Parties to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention,20 and the International Court of Justice21 considered all 
the territories that fell under Israeli control in 1967 to be occupied under the law of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention.  Solon Solomon, a former member of the Knesset’s legal 
department, summarizes that “throughout the post-1967 period” the common 
international view meant that “a legal certainty regarding the status of these territories 
existed.”22 
                                                
16 See e.g. U.N. Security Council Resolution 465, adopted unanimously 1 March 1980 at the 2203rd 
meeting, in Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council: 1980 (New York: United Nations, 1981) 
(supplemental volume to Security Council, Official Records: Thirty-Fifth Year), U.N. doc. S/INF/36, p. 5, 
preambular ¶ 4, operative ¶ 5. 
 
17 See e.g. “Letter from State Department Legal Adviser Concerning Legality of Israeli Settlements in the 
Occupied Territories,” 21 April 1978, printed as Appendix in House of Representatives, Israeli Settlements 
in the Occupied Territories, pp. 167–72, at pp. 169, 171–2. 
 
18 Boyd, p. 259. 
 
19 See e.g. Resolution III (“Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949”) of the 
XXIVth International Conference of the Red Cross (1981), in International Review of the Red Cross, no. 
224, September–October 1981, pp. 320–1, preambular ¶¶ 3–4, operative ¶¶ 2, 4–5, at pp. 320, 321. 
 
20 “Declaration of the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 5 
December 2001,” in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, vol. 4 (2001), pp. 664–7, ¶¶ 1, 3, 12–4, 
at pp. 664, 665, 666. 
 
21 I.C.J., Occupied Palestinian Territory, ¶ 95, at pp. 174–5 / 42–3. 
 
22 Solon Solomon, “Occupied or Not: The Question of Gaza’s Legal Status after the Israeli 
Disengagement,” Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 19, no. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 
59–89, at p. 64. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CHANGING SITUATION AFTER 2005 
Developments after 1967 such as the “Oslo process” of the 1990s had important 
effects, but they did not change the legal status of occupation.  Legally it would be 
difficult to argue that the Oslo accords could change that status, due to Article 47 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, which reads: “Protected persons who are in occupied 
territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of 
the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a 
territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement 
concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying 
Power.”23  The Israeli Supreme Court agreed that the situation of occupation still existed 
during this time period,24 and the International Court of Justice held that this was still true 
of the West Bank in 2004.25  The case did not directly concern Gaza, but its situation at 
the time was similar. 
More significant changes came starting in 2005, when Israel carried out its 
“Disengagement Plan.”  This meant the removal of the settlements and the soldiers 
stationed in Gaza.  From 2005 to 2010 the facts continued to shift in fairly complex ways, 
but in general Israel maintained its control over Gaza’s borders.  Then in 2011 a major 
change was set in motion again by the Egyptian revolution, which eventually led to real 
Palestinian control over the Rafaḥ crossing point on the southern border.  Gaza’s status 
has become less clear in light of these developments.  If Gaza is not occupied anymore, 
but is also not a sovereign territory, it might become terra nullius (Latin for “nobody’s 
land”), which would place it in an anomalous position under international law.  This 
chapter will give a general overview of circumstances from 2005 up to 2012, in order to 
clarify the facts necessary for a current legal analysis. 
                                                
23 Geneva IV, Art. 47, at p. 318. 
 
24 See e.g. Israeli High Court of Justice, H.C. 1661/05, Gaza Coast Regional Council et al. v. Knesset of 
Israel et al., as excerpted in English under this (translated) title in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, vol. 
37 (2007), pp. 358–67, ¶ 4 at p. 361. 
 
25 I.C.J., Occupied Palestinian Territory, ¶ 77–8, at p. 167 / 35. 
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Israel’s Disengagement Plan for Gaza was released as a public document in 
2004.26  The major points were: Israel would “redeploy outside the territory of the Strip 
. . . apart from military deployment along the border line between the Gaza Strip and 
Egypt”; “Israel will supervise and guard the external envelope on land, will maintain 
exclusive control in the air space of Gaza, and will continue to conduct military activities 
in the sea space of the Gaza Strip”; construction of ports was “subject to arrangements 
that will be determined with Israel”; “existing arrangements with regard to water and the 
electromagnetic area” remained in force;  “the economic arrangements that are currently 
in effect between Israel and the Palestinians” – including “taxation arrangements,” the 
“customs envelope,” “postal and communications arrangements,” “[t]he movement of 
goods between the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria [i.e., the West Bank], . . . and foreign 
countries,” and the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt – remained  in force; “[t]he 
Gaza Strip will be . . . devoid of armaments”; “there will be no foreign security presence 
in the Gaza Strip . . . that is not in coordination with Israel and with Israel’s agreement”; 
and “Israel reserves for itself the basic right of self-defense, including taking of 
preventative steps as well as responding by using force against threats that will emerge 
from the Gaza Strip.”27  “As a result” of the removal of “permanent Israeli civilian or 
military presence” from Gaza’s “continental expanse,” the plan states that “there will be 
no basis for the claim that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.”  In this way “[t]he 
disengagement move will obviate the claims about Israel with regard to its responsibility 
for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”28 
                                                
26 The plan went through at least three drafts.  See “Key Principles of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s 
Unilateral Disengagement Plan, Presented in Washington, 14 April 2004,” as reprinted from the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, Summer 2004, pp. 90–5 
(henceforth cited as “Disengagement Plan”); Prime Minister’s Office, “The Disengagement Plan – General 
Outline,” 18 April 2004, posted on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website (accessed February 
2013); Prime Minister’s Office, “Revised Disengagement Plan – Main Principles,” Addendum A to “The 
Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan,” 6 June 2004, posted on the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ website (accessed February 2013).  Though the different drafts of the plan did change 
some language having to do with Israel’s legal claims, the points for implementation are basically the same 
in all versions. 
 
27 Disengagement Plan, sections II.A.1, III.A, V, VI, VIII, X, XII.A.1, at pp. 91–4 passim. 
 
28 Disengagement Plan, sections I.F, II.A.2, at pp. 91, 92. 
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Despite this legal claim, however, Israel did not seek formal international 
recognition of a new relationship with Gaza, a decision which has been attributed to its 
desire to maintain flexibility.29  Israel’s decision not to confirm a new legal framework 
with the international community makes it harder to say that the occupation ended after 
the disengagement; but more important, there are factual problems in this respect.  As 
stated in the Disengagement Plan, the Israeli withdrawal was a redeployment to an 
“external envelope,” so that Israel still held control of the Strip from 360° around it (and 
in the air).  The legal test for occupation is whether or not the outside military power has 
effective control over a territory.30  Where a territory does not control its borders and 
airspace (and maritime space in this case) it does not have substantial autonomy at the 
international level, and so it may be said that the outside power commanding these areas 
has taken effective control.  Israel’s policymakers were aware of this, and government 
lawyers recognized that its legal claim to have ended the occupation would be weak as 
long as it held onto the “external envelope.”31  This was a further reason they did not seek 
to have the U.N. recognize that the occupation had ended.32 
Though Israel had full control over the northern and eastern land borders, the 
western border via the sea, and Gaza’s airspace, the situation on the southern border was 
more complicated.  The Disengagement Plan had stated that Israel would keep its 
“military deployment along the border line between the Gaza Strip and Egypt” after 
withdrawal, but in the end this did not happen.  Though it might be argued that Israel 
keeps a military presence over the southern border via its air force (which has sometimes 
bombed the Rafaḥ crossing area),33 it did not keep a ground presence.  Instead, after a 
period of more than two months in which the border was largely closed, a special 
                                                
29 Aronson, “Israel’s Disengagement,” pp. 55, 56, 60. 
 
30 Shane Darcy & John Reynolds, “An Enduring Occupation: The Status of the Gaza Strip from the 
Perspective of International Humanitarian Law,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 15, no. 2, 
Summer 2010, pp. 211–43, at pp. 216–22. 
 
31 Aronson, “Israel’s Disengagement,” pp. 50, 51. 
 
32 Ibid., pp. 59–60; Aluf Benn, “Israel proposes ‘in-between’ status for Gaza,” Haaretz online, 14 
November 2004 (accessed May 2013). 
 
33 Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Scale of Control: Israel’s Continued Responsibility in 
the Gaza Strip, November 2011, available online, p. 17. 
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agreement on the Rafaḥ crossing was brokered, principally between Israel and the 
Palestinian National Authority (P.N.A.), but with international involvement as well.34  
This Agreement on Movement and Access made the crossing’s opening conditional on 
both the physical presence of European Union monitors at the terminal,35 and Israeli 
monitoring of movements there via live camera and data transmission.36  Movement of 
goods other than personal effects was not allowed for,37 and entry of people other than 
Palestinians included in the Israeli-run population registry was strictly limited.38  Israel 
could object to movement of persons, which was supposed to set off a consultation 
between the Israeli, Palestinian, and E.U. sides.39  As can be seen, the arrangement was 
complicated; and the language of the Agreement did not suggest that Israel had the final 
word on the crossing’s operations.  In practice, however,  it would turn out that Israel still 
held ultimate control.  The crossing could not function according to the Agreement 
without the European presence, and was not allowed to function without the Israeli 
monitoring.  Israel often caused the crossing to close by not operating its control room 
and by halting the movement of the European monitors (who commuted to Rafaḥ via 
                                                
34 Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement & Physicians for Human Rights – Israel, Rafah 
Crossing: Who Holds the Keys?, March 2009, available online, pp. 21–3. 
 
35 “Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Agreement on Movement and Access in Connection with the Gaza 
Disengagement, Jerusalem, 15 November 2005,” as reprinted from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
website in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 35, no. 2, Winter 2006, pp. 184–7 (henceforth cited as 
“Agreement on Movement and Access”), “Agreement on Movement and Access” section – “Rafah” 
subsection, “Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing” section – “General” subsection, ¶¶ 2, 7, 14, “Agreed 
Principles for Rafah Crossing” section – “Third Party” subsection, ¶ 1, at pp. 185, 186, 187. 
 
36 The text of the Agreement did not actually refer to this Israeli role.  It describes the installation of 
cameras and a “liaison office, led by the 3rd party [the E.U.]” to monitor the crossing.  “Agreed Principles 
for Rafah Crossing” section – “General” subsection, ¶¶ 13, 19, at p. 186.  But, as discussed here, the 
Agreement was not actually implemented as it was written. 
 
37 Ibid., “Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing” section – “Security” subsection, ¶¶ 2, 3, at p. 186. 
 
38 Ibid., “Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing” section – “General” subsection, ¶¶ 3–4, at p. 186. 
 
39 Ibid., “Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing” section – “General” subsection, ¶¶ 3–6, “Agreed Principles 
for Rafah Crossing” section – “Security” subsection, ¶ 6, at pp. 186, 187. 
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Israel) on security grounds.  Its objections to movement of particular individuals through 
the crossing operated as effective vetoes.40 
Israel’s control of the crossing was often evident in the following years.  After 
Palestinian combatants took the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit captive on 25 June 2006, the 
crossing was almost completely closed for months.41  The transcript of a Ministry of 
Defense meeting that August which leaked to Israeli civil society revealed that the 
government regarded closure of Rafaḥ as a means of pressure to free the soldier.  The 
E.U. monitors believed that such pressure was aimed at the Gazan population.42  The 
Ministry of Defense document shows that the Israeli government assumed that it had the 
power to open and close Rafaḥ unilaterally.43  In June 2008, Israel announced publicly 
that, under a guarantee from Egypt’s President Ḥusnī Mubārak to Prime Minister Ehud 
Olmert, “Rafah crossing w[ould] not be open and return to normal business” unless the 
soldier was released.44 
During the same time period, “very few residents [were] allowed to leave, and 
only with Israeli permission,” wrote the Israeli legal scholar Solon Solomon at the end of 
2010.45  As these events show, being able to shut it down, Israel still had effective control 
over the crossing in the first years after the disengagement.  The Israeli human rights 
group Gisha, which has done the most detailed studies on this subject, wrote at the 
beginning of 2007 that “Israel exercises ultimate control over the opening of the Rafah 
crossing,” and “over the entrance and exit of all persons and goods by virtue of the ability 
                                                
40 Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, Disengaged Occupiers: The Legal Status of Gaza, 
January 2007, available online, pp. 32–9, 40, 45; Gisha & Physicians for Human Rights, Rafah Crossing, 
pp. 23–6. 
 
41 Gisha, Disengaged Occupiers, p. 36; Gisha & Physicians for Human Rights, Rafah Crossing, pp. 27–9. 
 
42 Avi Issacharoff, “Israel using Rafah crossing to pressure PA on Shalit release,” Haaretz online, 30 
August 2006 (accessed June 2013). 
 
43 Gisha, Disengaged Occupiers, pp. 59–61 (a partial translation of this document).  See also ibid., pp. 102–
3 (reprinting a letter from the Israeli government showing the same assumption). 
 
44 Steve Weizman, “Egypt pledges in Olmert-Mubarak talks not to reopen Gaza crossing till Israeli soldier 
is free,” Associated Press, 24 June 2008 (accessed May 2013 via LexisNexis database). 
 
45 Solomon, p. 81. 
 
 11 
to close all crossings into and out of Gaza.”46  Influence over the crossing became 
somewhat more dispersed after Ḥamās fully took over Gaza in the June 2007 Palestinian 
civil war, Israel declared the Strip an “enemy entity,” and all efforts at cooperation 
between Israel and the new Gazan government ceased.  But Israel still held significant 
power over Rafaḥ.  A detailed March 2009 report by Gisha and the Israeli branch of 
Physicians for Human Rights concluded that Israel then had “indirect – but substantial – 
control over the opening of the crossing.”47  Gisha notes the important point that, due to 
the extensive closures of the southern border after 2005, “disengagement has actually led 
to greater restrictions on the ability of most residents of Gaza to enter and leave the 
Strip.”48 
Israel’s continued indirect control over the crossing was dependent on the 
collaboration of the P.N.A. and, even more so, on Egypt’s cooperation.  That required 
link disappeared from the scene when the Egyptian revolution, starting in late January 
2011, led to the downfall of the Mubārak regime in Cairo.  With the successor Egyptian 
governments under more pressure to be responsive to public opinion, the unpopular 
policy of coordinating the closure of Rafaḥ with Israel was abandoned.  At the end of 
May 2011, Egypt officially announced that it was fully reopening the Rafaḥ crossing.49  
(Earlier, after the Mavi Marmara incident in June 2010 – described in the following 
chapter – Egypt had resumed regular operation of the crossing, but with restrictions that 
kept the level of movement at around 40% of its natural level.)50  From May 2011, 
coordination was made directly with the Ḥamās government in Gaza, and the E.U. 
monitors were not invited to return to their posts.51  The shift in policy has continued over 
the last two years, with a major transfer of goods via Rafaḥ (construction materials for 
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Monthly Humanitarian Monitor, available online, May 2011, p. 6. 
 
50 Ibid., p. 7; Gisha, Scale of Control, p. 15. 
 
51 O.C.H.A., Monthly Humanitarian Monitor, May 2011, p. 6. 
 
 12 
Qaṭarī-funded infrastructure projects in Gaza) occurring for the first time since before the 
disengagement in December 2012.52 
There is speculation that Egypt still coordinates Rafaḥ policy behind the scenes 
with Israel,53 and this is probably true to some extent, given the linkages built between 
the two countries’ security establishments over past decades, the influence of Israel’s 
U.S. ally in Cairo, and the Egyptian government’s own interests.  However, I know of no 
hard evidence for this, and it seems clear that the new Egyptian government is taking its 
own, independent stance towards the Ḥamās government in Gaza without deference to 
Israel.  In light of these developments, Gisha assessed in November 2011 that Israel had 
“significantly reduced” – but still “some” – control over the crossing.  The main avenue 
of its control at this point is its power over the Palestinian population registry, which still 
determines who enters Gaza as a resident54 (although Egypt and the Ḥamās government 
can and do allow entry by other categories of people as visitors).55  The question of the 
population registry is significant, but Israel’s power over Rafaḥ crossing at this point 
seems best characterizable as influence, rather than effective control. 
To summarize, the years after 2005 saw two major overall developments.  First, 
Israel withdraw its settlements and permanent troop presence, but did not otherwise let go 
of its effective control over Gaza.  The disengagement could be characterized as a 
redeployment of troops to positions of control around Gaza.  Because of this continued 
control, the international community did not accept that the occupation of Gaza had 
ended.  Second, a series of events reduced Israel’s control over the southern border, to the 
point that Israel did not really have effective control over the Rafaḥ crossing anymore.  
There were other major developments in Gaza during this time period, most of which 
support the argument that Gaza is still occupied.  They will therefore be reviewed in the 
following chapter.  The key point here is that, from 2005–12, despite the other ways in 
which Israel kept its control in place, one access point to the outside world did shift from 
Israel’s authority into Palestinian hands. 
                                                
52 Idem, Humanitarian Monitor: Monthly Report, December 2012, available online, pp. 1, 2, 3–4. 
 
53 Personal observations and conservations, Cairo, Rafaḥ crossing, and Gaza City, June 2011 – July 2012. 
 
54 Gisha, Scale of Control, pp. 16, 17–8. 
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CHAPTER III 
IS GAZA STILL OCCUPIED? 
 
Factors Suggesting that Gaza Is Still Occupied 
This chapter will review factors supporting the argument that Gaza is still 
occupied.  The main support for this argument is the fact that Israel has kept external 
control of Gaza in most ways, making the withdrawal most like a redeployment to an 
“external envelope,” in the words of the Disengagement Plan quoted above.  This chapter 
will describe the means through which that external envelope is maintained in greater 
detail, as well as the incursion into Gaza’s internal space that continues to occur. 
First there should be noted the more purely legal argument that Gaza remains 
occupied because it is part of the same territory, legally speaking, as the still-occupied 
West Bank.  The territorial unity and integrity of the West Bank and Gaza have been 
recognized by the U.N. Security Council56 and also by Israel in the major treaties of the 
Oslo process during the 1990s.57  These treaties were also, as the Israeli Supreme Court 
has held, “transformed into Israeli internal law by adequate legislation.”58  The Court has 
also confirmed that Gaza and the West Bank are a unified territory, even after the 
Palestinian civil war that divided them in 2007.59  Regarding Gaza as still occupied on 
this basis, without more, would be somewhat formalistic, but this territorial connection 
                                                
56 See e.g. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1860, adopted 14–0–1 (U.S. abstaining) 8 January 2009 at the 
6063rd meeting, in Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council: 1 August 2008 – 31 July 2009 (New 
York: United Nations, 2009) (supplemental volume to Security Council, Official Records), U.N. doc. 
S/INF/64, pp. 5–6, preambular ¶ 2, at p. 5. 
 
57 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements with attached Annexes and Agreed 
Minutes, signed by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) on 13 September 1993, in 
International Legal Materials, vol. 32, no. 6, November 1993, pp. 1527−41, Art. IV, Annex II, ¶ 6, at pp. 
1528, 1537; Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with selected 
attached Annexes and Maps, signed by Israel and the P.L.O. on 28 September 1995, in International Legal 
Materials, vol. 36, no. 3, May 1997, pp. 557−649, Arts. XI:1, XVII:1(a), XXXI:7–8, Annex I, Arts. I:2, I:4, 
XIII:11, at pp. 561, 564, 568, 569, 586. 
 
58 Israeli High Court, Gaza Coast Regional Council, ¶ 4 at p. 361. 
 
59 Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), ¶¶ 666–7, p. 277. 
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also has factual significance as long as Israel prevents movement between Gaza and the 
West Bank, as it has done since the since the start of the second intifāḍah in 2000.60 
On the factual level, Israeli military incursions continue despite the removal of its 
permanent troop presence.  During one period in the first half of 2010 sampled by the 
U.N., Israel Defense Forces (I.D.F.) incursions – which use military jeeps, bulldozers, 
tanks, and sometimes helicopters – were recorded an average of three times per week.61  
The Disengagement Plan suggested that Israel anticipated “taking of preventative steps as 
well as responding by using force against threats that will emerge from the Gaza Strip” 
after withdrawal.  Israeli politicians including Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had 
considered that a benefit of disengagement would be greater freedom of military action in 
Gaza.62  The Disengagement Plan describes these actions as “part of the basic right of 
self-defense,” but it is not clear that self-defense under international law allows military 
action of the sort Israel has undertaken; certainly “preventative steps” against “threats 
that will emerge” on an uncertain timeline are very controversial.  Yoram Dinstein, who 
is perhaps the most respected Israeli scholar of international law today, regards this 
military component as “the most telling aspect of the non-termination of the occupation.”  
Though he considers Israel’s moves to be “in response” to Palestinian rocket attacks, he 
writes that “Israeli military incursions into various parts of the Gaza Strip (as well as air 
and naval strikes) have occurred relentlessly subsequent to the unilateral withdrawal” and 
considers this proof of continued occupation.63  It is not only that these attacks are a way 
of imposing effective control; Israel’s continuing military operations in Gaza, if they 
                                                
60 B’Tselem & HaMoked – Center for the Defense of the Individual, One Big Prison: Freedom of 
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have an international legal basis, might also be said to depend on occupation law,64 which 
grants broad security powers.65 
Military force is also used as part of a general policy of blockade.  The military 
enforcement of the maritime blockade received international attention when Israel 
intercepted a flotilla of ships attempting to reach Gaza in May 2010 as a political protest 
against the Israeli policy.  The Israeli navy’s boarding of the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish 
vessel participating in the flotilla, resulted in the death of nine foreign nationals.  This 
was the most violent incident associated with the sea blockade, but the policy also has an 
internal component which affects Gazan residents on a regular basis.  Fishing along the 
Gazan coastline is limited to a box of sea space running north-to-south and extending to a 
depth of three nautical miles.  The fishing area was progressively reduced by the Israeli 
navy after the start of the second intifāḍah in 2000, from the 20 nautical miles initially 
agreed to in a 1994 Israel-Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) treaty, to six 
nautical miles by 2006, to the current three miles after 2008.  The restriction of fishing 
space is enforced by live warning fire, direct targeting of boats, and confiscations and 
detentions.  Casualties have occurred among Palestinian fishermen, and the policy has 
had a severe impact on the Gazan fishing industry, economically harming or displacing 
tens of thousands of people when the families of fishermen are taken into account.66 
It is difficult to make out the security rationale for this internal aspect of the 
blockade.  Israel cites concern about maritime arms smuggling as the reason for its naval 
deployment around Gaza.  However, an enlarged fishing area could certainly be allowed 
while still preventing the entry of arms.  Greater use of Israel’s naval resources might be 
needed to monitor such an expanded fishing area, but the humanitarian needs of the 
population outweigh the military inconvenience.  Under international law, coastal fishing 
vessels “are subject to the regulations of a belligerent naval commander . . . and to 
inspections,” but not to capture or attack, on the grounds that “disruption of this fishing 
would give no substantial benefit to the belligerents but would harm the population.”  
Regulation of coastal fishing “should be limited to what is necessary and should not in 
                                                
64 Aronson, “Israel’s Disengagement,” pp. 56–7. 
 
65 See e.g. Geneva IV, Art. 5, ¶ 2, at p. 292. 
 
66 O.C.H.A. & W.F.P., pp. 9, 10–1, 12. 
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practice disrupt the activities of [fishing] vessels to such a degree that it would undermine 
the purpose” of protecting local livelihoods.67 
Economic blockade has not yet been found to be unlawful, but it is an open 
question whether a blockade which harms the livelihood and development of the civilian 
population can really be squared with modern human rights and humanitarian law.68  In 
any case, the blockade on Gaza does not resemble blockade as envisioned in the laws of 
war or seen in past state practice.  The Gaza Strip was never allowed to develop an 
independent maritime trade under Israeli rule, or even to build a commercial port.  In 
2001, facilities set up preparatory to the building of a seaport were destroyed by Israel, 
and resumption of construction has been deterred because Israel will not give donors its 
assurance that a port project will not be attacked.69  Furthermore, the blockade has been 
in effect continuously both before and after the 2005 withdrawal.  Thus, despite the fact 
that there has been a state of armed conflict since 2000, the blockade on Gaza is not a 
temporary belligerent measure but a long-term means of control.  It is therefore a factor 
weighing in favor of the argument that Gaza is still occupied. 
As with the maritime blockade, Israeli policy still restricts internal freedom of 
movement on a part of the Gaza Strip’s land, the “buffer zone” along the eastern and 
northern borders next to Israel.  This policy too is actually one with older roots than the 
disengagement.  In earlier years, it was implemented especially in the south around 
Palestinian Rafaḥ, to separate the town – which straddles the border – from the side that 
falls on Egyptian territory.70  The basic idea of the buffer zone is to clear a strip of land 
between Israel and Gaza of Palestinian structures, and then to prevent Palestinian 
movement in that area.  On the borders shared with Israel, the buffer zone was expanded 
                                                
67 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 
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progressively after the first intifāḍah began, until it reached its current depth – ranging 
from 700 to 1,500 meters at different points along the border – in 2008.71  The buffer 
zone was completed during Operation Cast Lead, the major military attack on Gaza in 
winter 2008–9, when during the final days of the ground invasion Israel carried out 
extensive razing of land and structures along the borders.72  The prohibition on movement 
in the buffer zone is enforced by live fire, which has often resulted in civilian casualties, 
including numerous deaths.  The situation is complicated by the fact that Palestinian 
armed factions regularly operate in the border areas.  The majority of those killed in the 
buffer zone are combatants, whereas the majority of those injured are civilians.73 
The key fact about the buffer zone is that it was established inside Gaza rather 
than on Israel’s side of the border.  Maj.-Gen. Doron Almog, a former head of the I.D.F. 
Southern Command (which is in charge of Gaza), describes this as a military doctrine of 
“territorial overcharge.”74  This has substantial effects on Gaza’s internal situation.  The 
buffer zone largely prevents access to 17% of Gaza’s land, including 35% of its arable 
land.  The economic consequences, aside from their effect on productivity and 
development overall, directly affect the livelihoods of 12% of the population.75  Outside 
of occupation law, which gives the occupying power broad authority to ensure security 
(including its own) in foreign territory, there is no basis in international law for a state to 
take such measures on territory outside its sovereign borders.  (This does not mean, of 
course, that particular Israeli actions in Gaza are legal under occupation law, only that 
this branch of law provides the basis on which these kinds of measures would have to be 
justified.)  This legal context, and the fact that the buffer zone policy is an exercise of 
Israel’s “clear ability to influence [ ] living conditions in Gaza,”76 are major factors 
supporting the argument that Gaza is still occupied. 
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Living conditions are negatively affected by the external closure, often called 
(including by Israeli sources) a policy of siege.77  The maritime blockade has already 
been described.  There is also a kind of aerial blockade, since Israel will not permit use of 
Gazan airspace by any planes but those of its air force.  Israeli drones and jets overfly the 
Gaza Strip more or less continuously – on a weekly if not daily basis78 – whether to 
bomb, to monitor events on the ground, or, in earlier periods, to intimidate and frighten 
the population.79  The Israeli Air Force (I.A.F.) has argued since 2004 that today’s high 
technology allows it to take over many tasks “traditionally shouldered by ground forces,” 
including not only surveillance patrols but also territorial closure and even curfew 
enforcement.  Maj.-Gen. Amos Yadlin, former I.A.F. Chief of Staff and later head of the 
I.D.F.’s Command and Staff College, has described this approach in terms of a new 
military doctrine: “Our vision . . . zeroes in on the notion of control.  We’re looking at 
how you control a city, or a territory from the air when it’s no longer legitimate to hold or 
occupy that territory on the ground.”  “Instead of sending a company into the Gaza Strip, 
for example, we can perform the mission with a helicopter from standoff ranges. . . .  
Through smart use of air power . . . you can impose a siege, loiter over an area, maintain 
a presence in an area, [or] prevent movement.”  Maj.-Gen. Zeev Livne of Israel’s Ground 
Forces Command states that “there’s no doubt that technology has matured to the point 
that more massive control of territories can be imposed from the air.”80  Israel is not yet 
imposing curfews from the air in Gaza, but it is plainly using drones to monitor the 
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territory in ways incompatible with sovereign local control.  Furthermore, the domination 
of Gazan airspace prevents the Strip from developing trade links with the rest of the 
world through civil aviation, in the same way that the sea blockade prevents development 
of maritime trade links.  Gaza in fact had a functioning passenger airport for a few years, 
but it was rendered non-operational after the second intifāḍah broke out, first closed and 
later bombed by Israel.81 
The total control over airspace and sea space, and the high level of control over 
land borders, mean that Israel has extensive power over Gaza’s ability to carry out 
economic interactions with the outside world.  This trade dependence is exacerbated by 
the lasting impact of Israeli policies from 1967 to 2005 which made Israel Gaza’s only 
direct trading partner and its intermediary to the outside world.82  Rafaḥ was never used 
as an export terminal when it was under direct Israeli control (though it did handle a 
“relatively small” amount of imports).83  Gaza’s established trading links with the outside 
world are therefore all through Israel.  Export trade could be redirected overland through 
Egypt, though this would presumably require new infrastructure at Rafaḥ, and would not 
be ideal, since “[t]he geographic and economic links of Gaza are with Israel and not with 
Egypt, from which it is separated by scores of miles of desert.”84  Gazan imports and 
exports have been drastically curtailed by lengthy closures of the crossings on the Israeli 
border since 2000,85 and alternative trade patterns which can fully meet Gazan needs 
without relying on Israel have not yet been established.  In addition, the customs 
envelope which Israel maintains for both itself and the Palestinian territories, which the 
Disengagement Plan preserved, means that Israel collects the tariffs on imports for Gaza 
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and therefore continues to have partial fiscal control there.86  However, as is described in 
the next chapter, Ḥamās has managed to establish an independent tax base in Gaza. 
A characteristic common to these external economic controls is that they are 
legacy effects of the occupation up to 2005.  Gaza is heavily dependent on Israel due to 
this very lengthy period of direct control, as is commonly recognized by Israeli 
analysts.87  Furthermore, many post-disengagement actions have further reduced Gaza’s 
ability to meet its own needs.  In 2006, Israel bombed Gaza’s power station, substantially 
reducing its output.  It still has not been fully repaired, in part because of Israeli 
restrictions on movement of goods and people.  The power station is Gaza’s principal 
domestic source of electricity.  The majority of its electricity still comes from Israel, 
which interlinked the Israeli and Palestinian electrical grids after 1967.88  The destruction 
of infrastructure, government facilities, homes, and various civilian objects during 
Operation Cast Lead was extensive.  A U.N. Development Programme official estimated 
afterwards that “even should Gaza’s crossings be reopened fully and consistently remain 
that way, it would take five years to repair the damage – that is, to return the entity to the 
already degraded state in which it found itself after a punishing eighteen-month siege.”89  
The historical dependency of Gaza on Israel, which was shaped by occupation policies, 
constitutes a further argument that Gaza is still under effective Israeli control and thus 
occupied territory by law. 
The combined effect of these internal, external, and historical restraints on Gaza’s 
independence is substantial.  Yoram Dinstein writes that “When all this is tallied up . . . it 
should be palpable that the occupation cannot be viewed as over.”90  In light of the 
extensive control still existing, Israel’s position that its occupation ended after the 2005 
withdrawal has not been accepted by international bodies.  The office of the U.N. 
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Secretary-General has stated that it still defines Gaza as occupied territory,91 and that this 
definition would not change without a decision from the Security Council.92  The 
Security Council has not yet addressed the issue,93 though other U.N. bodies have made 
clear their position that Gaza is still occupied.94  The Israeli legal scholar Solon Solomon 
summarizes that  “the international community continued to treat the status of the Strip as 
if nothing had legally changed after Israeli disengagement.”95 
 
Factors Suggesting that Gaza Is No Longer Occupied 
Although Israel has retained a large degree of control over Gaza in the ways 
described in the previous chapter, three things have changed in Gaza after the 
disengagement that shift power to the Palestinian society there in important ways.  The 
first is that internal territorial continuity was achieved when the settlements and military 
facilities were removed.  (Gazan space is still disrupted by the buffer zone discussed 
above, but this reduces territory rather than breaking it up.)  The settlements and the 
military deployments around them separated Gazan localities from one another and 
divided the Strip into enclaves.  Their removal is one key to the formation of a coherent 
and healthy economy. 
The second important development is the changed situation at Rafaḥ after the 
Egyptian revolution, also described above.  The importance of Rafaḥ was discussed 
within the Israeli government in the lead-up to its withdrawal.  Because of the southern 
crossing’s significance for independent Palestinian control on the border, one Israeli 
official described a continued Israeli presence there as “tantamount to occupying the 
Gaza Strip as a whole.”96  Now that the Israeli presence and its indirect control are both 
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gone, Gaza has its own gateway to the outside world.  It is not an ideal gateway – it leads 
directly into the Sinai desert, which is a poor trading partner and creates major 
transportation costs for goods which could be avoided if Gaza had its own ports – but it is 
half in Palestinian hands, and the other half is no longer in Israeli hands but in those of a 
partially sympathetic neighbor that is no longer joining in the siege policy.  It does not 
make sense to speak of a siege – or at least not an effective siege – when there is a direct 
supply line which the enemy does not control.  The siege on Gaza can in fairness be said 
to be over.  What is left is an economically very damaging closure on all the other 
borders and means of access, but with an outlet point.  There are still many restrictions at 
Rafaḥ,97 but current reports indicate that these problems are between the new Egyptian 
government and the Ḥamās government in Gaza, which now negotiate on the subject 
directly.98 
The situation at Rafaḥ is related to the general situation along the southern border, 
especially the tunnel economy that was built up in response to the siege.  By now the 
tunnels are practically institutionalized.  They operate on a large and efficient scale, and 
commerce through them can shift to bring in particular materials that are in demand but 
are not being allowed to enter via the Israeli-controlled crossings – for example, cars in 
recent years.  Though they would not be sufficient to supply the whole economy, their 
operations are large enough to fill specific sectoral gaps.99  Most recently, for example, 
they have been bringing in construction materials – banned by Israel – on a very large 
scale.100  The shift to more sector-specific items like this became possible after mid-2010, 
when the internationally-demanded relaxation of Israeli restrictions allowed the tunnel 
economy to shift focus and become more than just an emergency measure to cope with 
the siege.  A second important factor is the decline in Israeli efforts to disrupt the tunnel 
economy.  Regular airstrikes on the tunnel area around Rafaḥ have noticeably declined in 
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the last two years.  For the moment, it appears that Israel has abandoned its general effort 
to destroy the tunnels, and instead strikes them as a form of punishment during military 
escalations.101  During an August 2011 escalation involving Israel and the smaller Gazan 
military factions, for example, an official explained that Israel wouldn’t escalate the 
situation by bombing tunnels unless Ḥamās resumed launching rockets.102 
The tunnels are also highly significant because they provide Ḥamās with a local 
tax base that cannot be touched by Israel.  (The West Bank P.N.A.’s taxes come largely 
from customs and value-added excises, which Israel collects as the authority at the 
borders and which it has withheld from the Palestinian government to achieve political 
goals.)103  Ḥamās now sees that it has a major interest in the tunnel system, which gives it 
greater freedom of action from Israel, major financial benefits, and an alliance with the 
wealthy business class that also benefits from the system.104  The International Crisis 
Group recently made the important observation that even if Egypt and the Gazan 
government reach agreement to turn Rafaḥ into a major commercial crossing, Ḥamās, 
“which stands to lose financially, might not follow through on closing the tunnels” as 
Cairo would prefer.105  This new financial base, and the enhanced internal authority that it 
gives the Ḥamās government, are a major part of why the Gazan government has 
“attributes of sovereignty” and “exercises power of a kind that those in Ramallah [the 
capital of the West Bank P.N.A.] can only dream about.”106 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF GAZA’S CURRENT STATUS 
With the facts and background on hand, we can now consider the current status of 
the Gaza Strip under international law.  A functional legal definition of occupation can be 
found in two articles from the 1907 Hague Regulations and one from the 1949 Fourth 
Geneva Convention.  Article 42 of the Hague Regulations considers territory occupied 
“when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.”107  The following 
paragraph adds: “The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised.”108  Article 43 reads: “The authority of the 
legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take 
all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety”109  The Fourth Geneva Convention, in Article 6,  similarly holds the occupying 
power responsible only “to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of 
government in [occupied] territory.”110 
The language used in the treaties – “when . . . actually placed under the 
authority,” “extends only to,” “power having in fact passed into the hands,” “all the 
measures in his power,” “as far as possible,” “to the extent that” – suggests two things.  
First, that the existence of an occupation is a specifically factual test; and second, that it 
can be treated as a matter of extent or degree, a spectrum, a continuum, a variable range, 
etc.  There is no need to treat it as an all-or-nothing status.  Law journals sometimes use 
the metaphor of a light-switch for this strict categorical approach: it has only two 
positions, on or off.111  An oddity in the scholarly legal discussion of Gaza so far has 
been the frequent assumption that occupation law can only offer this kind of binary test.  
Even some authors who see clearly that this binary approach is problematic in the real 
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world still accept it without argument as the correct legal interpretation.112  But the 
language of the legal instruments does not mandate this, and it is not an ideal approach 
for complicated real-world cases.  The language from the treaties is much more 
compatible with the flexible approach.  It is true that the Hague Convention linked its 
partial-occupation language to territory, but this does not automatically rule out a 
spectrum approach to occupation authority as well.  If this point was in doubt before 
1949, the language from Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention adopted that year 
(quoted above) clearly allows for a partial approach to occupation authority.  This 
approach would also seem to be implicit in the Geneva Convention’s position that 
authority over education, child care,113 medical establishments, and health and hygiene 
services114 are not automatically taken over by the occupying power but should where 
possible be run in cooperation with local authorities.  Interestingly, the Negotiations 
Affairs Department of the P.L.O., which generally argues that the disengagement from 
Gaza did not change the situation, has commented that “the absence of a ‘permanent’ 
Israeli military presence and illegal settlers will mark a significant change in Gaza’s 37-
year-history of belligerent Israeli occupation.  The Fourth Geneva Convention does 
indeed contemplate changes in the degree of occupation.”115 
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What is the existing degree of occupation?  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the most important change in authority is the shift of power over the southern border 
from Israel and a collaborating Egyptian government to Gaza and a realigned Egyptian 
government.  That change means an end to the siege and an independent Gazan door onto 
the outside world.  But the whole southern border with Egypt is only 10.8% of Gaza’s 
perimeter, or 18.0% of its land perimeter.116  With such a limited degree of international 
autonomy, Gaza is far from being a sovereign entity.  The limited opening on the 
southern border may mean that the siege is over, but trade via sea and air is so important 
to modern states that a country does not have regular “freedom of movement” on the 
international scene without it. 
Deciding the status of Gaza after 2011 depends on weighing these factors in 
particular against each other.  It is this disruption of the Disengagement Plan’s “external 
envelope” – the fact that Israel still controls all access except for one small area – that 
most complicates the balancing test.  Analysis of this kind of reduced or partial form of 
occupation has not been widespread to date.  As mentioned earlier, legal scholars have 
not answered the question outside of a binary framework.  None of the law journal 
articles cited in this thesis takes a partial-occupation approach, or even accepts that such 
an approach is legally available.  Most legal analyses of the new situation in Gaza came 
within the first five years of the Disengagement Plan’s announcement.  Little new 
commentary has appeared after the early months following Operation Cast Lead, which 
brought a new round of legal attention to this question because of its significance for the 
legal standards used to judge that military action.  But the most important development 
concerning Gaza’s status – the loss of Israeli control, direct or indirect, over the southern 
border – only developed afterwards, especially from May 2011 on.  A general legal 
reappraisal is due because of this change. 
Commentators not writing from an academic law background have also tended 
not to address the partial-occupation possibility.  Geoffrey Aronson, considering these 
issues before the Disengagement Plan had been implemented, wrote that “If the security 
envelope is retained, . . . Israel would still qualify as the occupying power under the 
                                                
116 My calculation, based on figures from Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook online, s.v. “Gaza 
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internationally accepted Hague standard insofar as it would still be exercising effective 
military control of the Strip.”  But he did not analyze what would happen if Rafaḥ was 
excepted from the envelope.117  Sara Roy, on the other hand, has written that “Whether or 
not Israel eventually withdraws from the Philadelphi corridor” – another name for the 
Gazan-Egyptian border – “is ultimately irrelevant,” because its control “over Gaza’s 
airspace and territorial waters . . . translates into full control over the movement of people 
and goods into and out of the Strip.”118  But that is an exaggeration.  By definition, 
Palestinian control over a crossing point where Israel is absent means at least some 
control over movement of people and goods.  Some nongovernmental organizations, 
perhaps because of their work on the ground, have taken the degree-of-occupation 
approach proposed here.  Gisha, in particular, and also apparently the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, holds that “Israel’s responsibility for the Gaza Strip extends 
to the areas which Israel controls. . . .  In the areas in which Israel gave up its control and 
allowed others to exercise control, its responsibility is reduced.”119 
Plainly, Gaza is not a fully sovereign entity, though it has moved slightly closer to 
that status.  The limits on its sovereignty come from military dominance by another 
country.  Occupation law – interpreted flexibly, instead of on the binary model – is the 
body of law designed and best suited to cover this situation.  There are other scenarios in 
which a country can be something less than a sovereign independent state – as part of a 
commonwealth or a trust territory, for example – but these are based on consent, which is 
itself a way of respecting sovereignty.  A country can waive a part of its ordinary 
sovereignty in order to receive some benefit it sees in a different international 
arrangement.  But when a country loses effective control over its national life to a foreign 
enemy’s military power, occupation is the best-developed international-law concept to 
govern the situation.  If Gaza is not sovereign in many ways because of Israeli military 
power, then legally it makes most sense – and is really only fair – to hold that it is still 
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occupied in those ways.  A 2008 article in the major Israeli law journal – by an author 
who in fact holds that the occupation is over – commented accurately that “Israel seeks to 
evade its responsibilities as an occupier but, on the other hand, to continue [to] control 
important aspects of life in Gaza.”120  Such a strategy, which perpetuates injustice and 
leaves the Gazan population with dangerous gaps in its legal protection, should not 
receive legal approval. 
Recognizing that Gaza’s status has shifted from one of full occupation has a 
number of legal implications.  One is that responsibility for the population’s well-being 
has to be looked at on a case-by-case basis under the specific provisions of occupation 
law.  Israel will only have responsibility for those areas, like electricity, where it 
continues to have power.  Many sectors will fall under the full authority and 
responsibility of the Gazan government.  Law and public order and the large majority of 
administrative functions are already in this category. 
Another legal result, with far-reaching consequences, is that many military actions 
on both sides will no longer be governed by occupation law but by the regular law of 
armed conflict.  Armed Palestinian acts, even when they only target military sites, are not 
likely to be characterizable as “resistance to occupation” under these circumstances.  
Without a specific link to some continued aspect of occupation, they become armed 
attacks across an international border, which have the potential to reach the level of 
aggression.  On the other hand, Palestinian military actions may also, depending on 
circumstances, become “legitimate acts of self-defense across a border.”121  Israeli 
military actions aiming to impose measures for its own security inside Gaza no longer 
have any legal legitimacy, since the occupying state’s security powers are linked to 
“fulfil[ling] its obligations” for the well-being of the population, “maintain[ing] the 
orderly government of the territory,” and protecting “the members and property of the 
occupying forces or administration” in such territory.122  Israel might continue to take 
military action to protect areas where its administration of Gazan affairs still exists (to 
prevent attacks on the border crossings which it still operates, for example), but otherwise 
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its use of force is limited by the ordinary law of self-defense, which does not allow for 
extraterritorial imposition of security measures.  The legally permitted form of military 
action will also change.  An occupying power’s security authority is closer to a 
governmental policing framework than to the rules of war, focusing on steps such as 
detention and internment.  The law of armed conflict, on the other hand, is about 
inflicting casualties on the enemy.  Israeli military actions after disengagement – 
provided that they meet the requirements of self-defense – may therefore legally be much 
more violent, focusing on killing Gazan combatants rather than detaining them. 
Clearly, many of the legal rules on government, the population’s well-being, and 
armed conflict will shift with the new status quo in Gaza.  A full discussion of these 
changes is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Future legal analysis could usefully be 
focused on specific, provision-by-provision examination of the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions’ rules on occupation and how they relate to the new situation in Gaza.  This 
analysis would both provide answers to where responsibility and authority lies in 
particular areas, and help define the exact extent to which the occupation is still in place. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL DEBATE AND ITS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis has argued that, because of the factual changes occurring in Gaza after 
2005 and particularly from 2011 on, a new legal reality of partial occupation should be 
recognized.  This approach would be in accordance with the language of the relevant 
international treaties, would be able to respond in a nuanced way to a complex factual 
situation, and most importantly would give necessary legal protection to a population that 
has suffered far too much.  Legal questions might seem abstract, but they can have 
concrete results.  The improved climate in international law governing war and human 
rights is part of the reason why Israel has not “solved” its conflict with the Palestinians by 
expelling them completely, as happened in similar conflicts during earlier centuries.  
There are continued reasons for concern today if occupation law is pushed aside in Gaza.  
This branch of law, because it recognizes that control and responsibility must be linked, 
offers a higher standard of protection than the law of armed conflict which might 
otherwise govern all events in Gaza.  As noted earlier, for example, Gaza is still 
dependent on Israel for most of its electricity.  Yoram Dinstein comments that 
 
The notion that a Belligerent Party in wartime is in duty bound to supply 
electricity and fuel to its enemy is plainly absurd.  The sole reason for the 
existence of an obligation to ensure such supplies for the benefit of the civilian 
population – even at a minimal level – is that the occupation is not over.123 
 
This is one of various cases involving responsibility for the well-being of the civilian 
population where the law of armed conflict would leave a dangerous gap. 
Probably the failure to accept a mixed scenario – partial occupation, partial local 
control – comes from the ideological splits that often crop up around the Israel-Palestine 
conflict.  It is true that the finding of partial occupation is not the neatest or most 
“satisfying” result.  It leads to a more involved, case-by-case legal framework, instead of 
a global “bright-line” rule that can answer the question quickly and simply.  But it is not 
too complicated to take this case-by-case approach, and it is not that the law cannot 
handle it.  Many fields of law contain complexity and offer cases that cannot be decided 
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with binary, bright-line rules.  Constitutional law, for example, has to deal with divisions 
of power between governmental branches and confronts cases in which it is not always 
clear where one branch’s authority ends and the other’s begins.  This offers a close 
analogy to the kind of analysis – looking closely at where control and responsibility are 
held – that is appropriate for the Gazan case.  If legal authors have so far avoided this 
approach, then, it is most likely not because of legal necessity but because the ideological 
divide over the conflict has reached this field as well.  My conclusion, however, is that 
the welfare of the population would be better served by a kind of law that can tackle 
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